Besides these kinds of propositions which we have hitherto defended not to be lies [in earlier chapters], although by them always some truth is concealed, there be some other ways, whereby without a lie a truth may be covered, which I will briefly set down.

1. First, we use some equivocal word which hath many significations, and we understand it in one sense, which is true, although the hearer conceive the other, which is false . . . [as for example,] if one should be asked whether such a stranger lodgeth in my house, and I should answer, “he lieth not in my house,” meaning that he doth not tell a lie there, although he lodge there.

2. Secondly, when unto one question may be given many answers, we may yield one and conceal the other.... So may it happen that one coming to a place to hear mass may answer them who ask the cause of his coming, that he came to dinner or to visit some person which is there, or with some other alleged cause satisfy the demanders.

3. Thirdly, the whole sentence which we pronounce, or some word thereof, or the manner of pointing or dividing the sentence, may be ambiguous, and we speak it in one sense true for our own advantage. So it is recorded of St. Francis, that being asked of one who was sought for to death, whether he came not that way, he answered (putting his hand into his sleeve, or as some say into his ear), “he came not this way.”

4. To these three ways of concealing a truth by words if we add the other of which we spoke before, that is, when we utter certain words, which of themselves may engender a false conceit in the mind of the hearers, and yet with somewhat which we understand and reserve in our minds maketh a true proposition, then shall we have four way show to conceal a truth without making of a lie.